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ABSTRACT:  Following the Optimum Currency Areas approach, recent theoretical and
empirical studies have concluded that asymmetric shocks play a fundamental role to assess
the success of EMU. In a previous study, we found strong evidence supporting a reduction of
asymmetric shocks at a national level in the most recent years. Taking into account these
results, one should expect that benefits of EMU would overweight costs. However, there are
some other questions that should be considered. In this paper, we analyse the possible
consequences of the reduction of asymmetric shocks on regional convergence, putting special
attention to differences in the transmission of the single monetary policy and the implications
of the Stability Pact at a regional level.
Keywords: EMU, Optimum currency areas,  Asymmetric shocks, Convergence, Monetary
transmission mechanisms, Stability Pact.1
EMU: SOME UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
1. Introduction
Most studies that have analysed the possible effects of the European Monetary Unification
process following the Optimum Currency Area approach have concluded that the success of
EMU is related to the degree of flexibility and cyclical symmetry of the European economies.
With no doubt, the main cost of joining a currency area is the loss of monetary policy
instruments at a national level (e.g. the exchange rate) as stabilisation mechanisms against
macroeconomic disturbances that only affect one country of the area or affect them in
different manners. As this kind of macroeconomic disturbances, known as “asymmetric
shocks”, cannot be dealt by a common monetary policy, a high degree of flexibility is needed
to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation. However, there is a wide consensus that European
countries have a lower response capacity in front of adverse asymmetric shocks than other
currency areas, so the role of asymmetric shocks is a key question. In this sense, the most
optimistic view about the risks associated to asymmetric shocks (specific shocks that cannot
be dealt by a common monetary policy) is given by the European Commission (1990) in the
report “One Market, One Money”. In this study, the Commission predicts that asymmetric
shocks will tend to reduce as a result of the greatest co-ordination among European countries,
the increase of intra-industry trade and the similarities of European economic structures. The
alternative view, defended among others by Krugman, suggests that the complete removal of
barriers to trade and the improvement of functioning of the Single Market as a result of the
Monetary Unification will increase the productive specialisation of European regions. As a
result, shocks will tend to be more asymmetric.
The debate about the relevance of asymmetric shocks as a key element to assess the net
benefits of EMU is not closed yet. Some recent studies, such as Frankel and Rose (1997) or
Ramos et al. (1999), indicate that shocks experienced by European countries have tended to
be more symmetric. However, one of the main shortages of this kind of analysis is that the
possible asymmetries derived from differences in the transmission of monetary policy
between the countries taking part in the currency area have not been considered. As Kieler
and Saarenheimo (1998, p. 1) affirm: “Important differences in the impact of the single2
monetary policy would be a potential source of cyclical divergence and could impose
significant adjustment demands on other economic policies”. However, and in spite of its
relevance, this fact has not been explicitly analysed since recent years.
The objective of this paper is to analyse the implications of the existence of different
responses to common monetary shocks at a regional level in a well-established currency area
as a way to evaluate the potential asymmetric effects of the Single Monetary Policy on the
Euro Zone countries and regions. In particular, we analyse the different impact of monetary
policy on output and prices evolution in the Spanish regions. The structure of the paper is as
follows: First, the main mechanisms of monetary policy transmission are analysed from a
theoretical perspective; second, the available empirical evidence about different responses to
monetary shocks and its determinants is reviewed; and next, the main results about
asymmetries in output and prices response to monetary shocks in the Spanish regions are
shown; and, last, the paper finishes summarising the main implications of these results in
relation to EMU.
2. The mechanisms of monetary transmission
As it is well known, monetary policy can be a very useful tool to correct macroeconomic
desequilibria. However, sometimes the implementation of a particular monetary policy can
have unexpected or unwanted consequences related not also to the existence of lags between
the adoption of the measure and its effects but also to the magnitude of these effects. These
adverse consequences are usually related to the characteristics of the mechanisms through
which monetary policy influences real economy. These mechanisms are known as
“transmission mechanisms or channels”. In the literature, four different mechanisms have
been identified: The interest rate channel, the exchange rate channel, the asset prices channel
and the credit channel.
From a very simple point of view, interactions between financial variables and non-financial
activity can be reduced and simplified to interactions between interest rates and non-financial
activity. In this sense, the underlying presumption of this literature is that monetary authority
exercises power over economic behaviour of private-sector agents by influencing the financial
(opportunity) cost relevant to the spending decisions of these agents and the main implication
of this view is that variations in the interest rate operating through changes in the cost of3
capital are extremely important in the monetary transmission mechanism (Taylor, 1995). This
is called the interest rate channel. In Taylor’s model, contractionary monetary policy raises
the short-term nominal interest rate and then, through a combination of sticky prices and
rational expectations, the real long-term interest rate rises as well, at least for a time. These
higher real interest rates lead to a decline in business fixed investment, residential housing
investment, consumer durable expenditure and inventory investment, which produces the
desired decline in aggregate output. This mechanism is based, then, on the well-known IS-LM
keynesian model. Following this view, the main features of the transmission of the monetary
policy are related to the extent that the central bank interest rate is being used in the economy
and to the other factors such as the “life” of financial contracts (if the interest rate is fixed for
a long period of time, the effect of monetary policy will be lower).
Another factor through which changes in monetary policy instruments influence non-financial
activity operates through the exchange rate (Menon, 1995). The interpretation of the exchange
rate channel is related with the impact on non-financial activity of monetary policy decisions
through movements in the balance of payments. Under flexible exchange rates, a change in
the domestic instrument variable ceteris paribus elicits movements in the exchange rate. This
channel also involves interest rates effects, because when domestic real interest rates rise,
domestic national currency deposits become more attractive relative to deposits denominated
in foreign currencies leading to a rise in the value of national currency deposits relative to
other currency, which causes a appreciation of the national currency. The higher value of the
domestic currency makes domestic goods more expensive than foreign goods, thereby causing
a fall in net exports and hence in aggregate output (altering the relative prices of national and
foreign goods).
As Meltzer (1995) emphasises, a key objection to the keynesian paradigm for analysing
monetary policy effects on the economy (present in the two previously presented “channels”),
is that it only focuses on one relative asset prices, the interest rate (and the exchange rate but
in relation to it). The description of the Japanese experience during the 80s and 90s in Meltzer
(1995) shows how monetary policy can have a relevant impact on non-financial activity
through its effect on land and property values. This channel, known as asset prices channel,
relative prices channel or stock market channels, assumes that monetary policy has influence
on the prices (and composition) of agent’s assets portfolios through changes in the
opportunity cost and, as a result, when agents try to bring into balance their portfolios (having4
effects on their consumption decisions), the investment decisions of firms that are quoted at
the stock market are also affected. Following this theory, the main source of differences in
monetary transmission will be related to the extent to which the agents hold financial assets
whose prices may vary in reaction to unexpected changes in monetary policy.
However, these channels of monetary transmission (or at least the most traditional: interest
rate and exchange rate) have recently received considerable criticism as it is assumed that
credit markets tend to come back to equilibrium. In fact, the main criticism to the previous
approaches is related to the assumption of perfect information and the lack of consideration of
incentive problems. In this alternative view, financial prices do not clear the credit market
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). This approach to the transmission process is known as the
credit channel. In this case, the efficient functioning of the market credit is hindered by
asymmetries in information between borrowers and lenders, resulting in principal-agent
problems. These problems lead to endogenous and varying credit conditions with help to
shape the transmission of monetary policy decisions to economy. This uncertainty generates a
potential important role for financial intermediaries who specialise in gathering and distilling
agent-specific information. The implication is that financial intermediaries, usually banks,
play a unique role in the monetary transmission process, acting as an interface between the
policy decisions of the central bank and non-financial activity.
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) emphasise how asymmetric information and costly enforcement
of contracts creates agency problems in financial markets. Two basic channels of monetary
transmission arise as a result of agency problems in credit markets: the bank lending channel
and the balance-sheet channel.
The bank lending channel is based on the view that banks play a special role in the financial
system because they are specially well suited to deal with certain types of borrowers,
especially small firms where the problems of asymmetric information can be very
pronounced. In this context, the relationships between small firms and banks play a strategic
role in the transmission of monetary policy. The way this channel works is the following:
assuming that the total available quantity of credit is limited, a restriction of bank credit will
restrict the investment possibilities of small firms (but not for large firms as they can access to
credit through stock markets), translating the restrictive effects, through multiplier-effects, to
the rest of the non-financial sector.5
The balance-sheet channel operates through the net worth of business firms and this is related
with the ability of firms to borrow. In this literature, the  borrower’s financial position is
influenced by the monetary policy and the business cycle. Under a restrictive monetary
policy, the firm’s asset prices are lower reducing the net worth of the firm while the cost of
external financing is higher making investment much more difficult. As Schmidt (1999)
remarks, for firms with problems to access external credit markets, there is an “external
finance premium cost” which is a positive function of the interest rate: the cost moves in the
same direction as a consequence of the own situation of the firm.
Summarising, although there is not a complete agreement (and probably not a full
understanding on the way the monetary policy works), both real economy and financial
factors play a fundamental role in the transmission of monetary policy and in the possible
asymmetries that generates. In the next section, a brief summary on the available empirical
evidence on asymmetries on the transmission of monetary policy and its determinants is done.
Figure 1. Monetary policy transmission channels
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3. Empirical evidence on asymmetries on the transmission of monetary policy and its
determinants
There is a broad empirical evidence on the existence of asymmetries on the transmission of
monetary policy.  In this sense, it is possible to identify three different and well-defined
research lines: First, some authors use different econometric techniques to identify and
quantify the existence of asymmetries in the effect of monetary policy on output; second,
other authors justify the lack of agreement of the previous group remarking that the effects of
monetary policy are asymmetric between countries as they are in different stages of the
business cycle; and, last, the third group are interested in obtaining empirical evidence about
the determinants of the asymmetries considering the two previous lines of research.
In reference to the first research line, probably the one with the widest diffusion, there are
significant differences among countries in terms of output response to monetary shocks.
However, there is no agreement about the classification of countries in term of these
differences. As Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998, p. 32) affirm: “the results have generally
varied a great deal and, as a result, no consensus regarding the likely extent of nature of these
differences has arisen”.  In this sense, the analysis of different time periods, different
assumptions about the exchange rate system in the considered countries and the use of
different econometric techniques (large scale macroeconomic models, single equation models
or structural VAR models, among others, see Britton and Whitley, 1997) would explain this
lack of agreement.
The second research line previously mentioned justifies the previous results assuming that the
effects of monetary policy are asymmetric over the business cycle and, as a result, countries
in different stages of the cycle would experience different responses to a common monetary
shock. The empirical evidence obtained by Kakes (1998) for Germany, Belgium, the United
Kingdom and the United States and María (1997) for Spain show that monetary policy is
much more effective during expansions than during recessions. However, differences among
countries in output responses to monetary shocks are not completely explained by this
hypothesis.
For this reason, the third considered research line focuses on identifying using empirical
evidence, but taking as a starting point the previously explained framework of monetary7
policy transmission channels, the possible determinants of different responses to a common
monetary shock. The main features of this approach are the following: First, measures of the
long-run response of output to a monetary shock are obtained (using one of the different
econometric techniques proposed in the literature, for example, VAR models); and, second,
using the obtained measures as endogenous variables, a multiple regression analysis is carried
out using as explanatory those related to differences in the monetary policy transmission
channels. The most important references in this research line are Carlino and DeFina (1998,
1999) who have analysed the case of the American States and of countries participating in
EMU. De Lucio and Izquierdo (1998) have also applied this methodology for the case of
Spanish regions.
Carlino and DeFina (1998) consider that asymmetries of monetary policy should be analysed
in the presence of a common monetary policy but usually the fact that every country has been
subjected to its own monetary shocks during the considered period is not taken into account
being this one of the main deficiencies of the first group of authors. In this sense, the analysis
of differences in monetary policy output response between European countries would be
especially difficult, as there is no available historical data. To solve this problem, Carlino and
DeFina (1998) extrapolate the evidence obtained for the American States (which have been
exposed to a common monetary policy for a long period and where important differences
were detected) to analyse the case of European countries. In particular, in a first step, they
identify the possible determinants of asymmetries for the American case using the previously
exposed methodology and the influence of these determinants on the long-run response of
output to a common monetary shock. In a second step, they combine the estimates of the
influence of these determinants with European data. The determinants of the differences in
output responses are related to the economic and financial structure of the considered
territories, which can be summarised as follows:
i.  The industry-mix of the territory: The existence of different elasticities of the domestic
demand to changes in the interest rates can explain different responses of output to a
common monetary shock. For example, residential investment does not react to
changes in monetary policy in the same way as capital goods investment. This variable
is related to differences in the effectively of the interest rate channel in every territory;8
ii.  The size of the firms in the territory: As relationships between financial intermediaries
and small firms are very different to relationships between banks and big companies.
As a result, a greater concentration of small firms in a given territory will explain part
of the different responses to monetary policy. This variable reflects, partially, the
different peculiarities in the asset prices and credit transmission channels; and,
iii.  The financial structure of the territory: This variable can be measured as the
percentage of loans given by local banks, the relative weight of the 3 first banks or
other similar ratios. This variable is related with the bank channel.
The consideration of these characteristics for European countries show that countries as
Spain, Finland and Ireland have a greater response than France, Netherlands or Italy to a
common monetary shock while Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal have a
very similar response and near to the average. In this sense, the results of Carlino and DeFina
(1998) show evidence in favour of the possibility that differences in monetary policy
responses could generate asymmetries in output evolution and, as a result, higher potential
costs derived from EMU.
A possible critique for these results is related with the dangers of extrapolating the results for
the American states to the European regions. To solve this problem, other possibility consists
in analysing the relevance of differences in monetary policy response in a well-established
currency area. In this sense, the analysis of European countries at a regional level offers this
possibility. De Lucio and Izquierdo (1998) analyse the case of the Spanish regions using the
long-run response of employment to a common monetary shock as an endogenous variable to
identify the possible determinants of asymmetries. The explanatory variables of the different
response are very similar to the ones found by Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999).
Summarising, the literature reviewed in this section, there is  a clear evidence about the
existence of national/regional asymmetries in responses to a common monetary policy and its
possible determinants. However, there is little research done on evaluating the existence of
asymmetries using direct information about these determinants and, which is more important,
in relating these differences with a lower cyclical symmetry on output evolution at a regional
level. In the next section a methodology is proposed to obtain a direct indicator of the relative
response of Spanish regions to a common monetary shock using data about its determinants9
and, next, we analyse the implications of the existence of these asymmetries on regional
output evolution. The implications for EMU are clear and straightforward.
4. Implications for the European Regions: The Spanish case
As it has been previously exposed, the existence of different responses to a common monetary
policy can increase the degree of asymmetry among countries or regions taking part in a
currency area. The objective of this section consists in analysing the relevance of the different
impacts of monetary policy as a determinant of different output and prices evolution at a
regional level. First, a methodology to obtain a measure of the regional relative response to a
common monetary shock is proposed and second, the relationships between this indicator and
the output and prices evolution are considered.
4.1. Methodology and data
The results obtained by previous authors summarised in the previous  sections remark the
relevance of differences in economic and financial structures as determinants of the regional
response to monetary policy (see figure 2).
In reference to the first aspect, as it has been stated in the introduction, from a theoretical
perspective it is possible that regional differences in economic activity will increase under
EMU. If this happens, the regional response of output to monetary policy will be more
different increasing the asymmetry and making more difficult macroeconomic adjustment in
participating countries. Although the available empirical evidence does not reflect any
important change in the most recent years in terms of an increase of specialisation, nowadays
there are important differences in the regional industry-mix, which allow the existence of
different responses. In this sense, together with the differences in the size of firms located in
the territory, these are the factors that must be taken into account to evaluate the existence of
different regional responses to a common monetary shock10
Figure 2. Theoretical and empirical determinants of the asymmetric effects of the monetary
policy
In respect to the second aspect, as Rodriguez-Fuentes (1997, p. 217) affirms for the Spanish
case that: “... we could assume that the degree of (financial) development is homogeneous in a
given country as the financial system is not subjected to any kind of segmentation at a
regional level from an institutional point of view...” However, as the same author remarks (p.
219): “the fact that regulations do not promote a regional market segmentation does not imply
that there is no segmentation”. In this sense, the most important factor that can act as a
differentiating is the existence of region-specific financial agents. However, the effects of
regional banking on responses to monetary policy are not clear.  In fact, they could be
ambiguous: on one hand, regions with a bigger number of region-specific banks could be less
affected by national monetary policy than the rest; but, on the other hand, it is possible that if
there is a great competition between regional and not-regional banks the response could be
greater. Moreover, it seems plausible that after the introduction of the Euro, the single
currency could act as “a catalyser, increasing the competition and accelerating structural
changes in the financial sector, promoting a real single market of financial services” (ECB,
1999). Taking into account this fact, it is possible that regional differences on financial
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structures will tend to vanish. In table 1, it can be seen that the degree of bank concentration
in European countries is converging to similar values. Other relevant factor, is the reduction
of the need of having a vast and extensive network of bank offices in the territories where the
financial agents wants to operate. Thanks to new information technologies and to the increase
of competition between regional and non-regional financial institutions, there is a clear
incentive to operate in the greatest number of territories as marginal costs are continuously
decreasing.
Table 1. Bank concentration at a national level: Deposits of the five most important financial
entities as a percentage of total financial deposits
1985 1990 1995 1997
Belgium 48,0 48,0 54,0 57,0
Denmark 13,9 16,7 16,7
Spain 38,1 34,9 45,6 43,6
France 46,0 42,5 41,3 40,3
Ireland 47,5 44,2 44,4 40,7
Italy 20,9 19,1 26,1 24,6
Luxembourg 21,2 22,4
Netherlands 69,3 73,4 76,1 79,4
Austria 35,9 34,6 39,2 48,3
Portugal 61,0 58,0 74,0 76,0
Finland 51,7 53,5 68,6 77,8
Source: ECB (1999)
Taking into account the previous exposition, if we want to evaluate the existence of
differences in regional responses to monetary policy, we should consider information about
three different aspects: the industry-mix, the firm size and the financial structure. However,
the most important are the two first as it seems quite plausible that regional differences in
financial structures will tend to disappear (or at least reduce) in a near future. For this reason,
the methodology that we propose to analyse the different impact of monetary policy will only
consider the two first determinants.12
In particular, the industry-mix of the territory is approximated by two different variables: the
relative weights of the manufacturing and the building sectors on the total Gross Added Value
(GAV) of the region. In this sense, as the manufacturing and the building sectors are much
more sensitive to monetary policy decisions than other sectors (keynesian transmission
mechanisms), in regions where these sectors are more important, the response to monetary
shocks will be higher than in the rest.
In respect to the size of regional firms, the firm size has been approximated by the average
number of workers per establishment in every region. Firms with a higher number of workers
(a bigger size) have more possibilities to access capital markets or to have more capacity for
self-financing. So, if firms located in a given region are bigger than firms in the other,
monetary policy would be less effective there than in the others.
In this sense, the regional response of a given region to a monetary shock in relation to the
rest of regions in the country will be determined by the values of these three variables: it will
be higher than in the rest if the manufacturing and the building are more relevant in the
considered regions, and it will be lower, if the average firm size is higher than in the rest. So,
if we are interested in identifying those regions in a country with a higher or lower relative
response to monetary policy, it is possible to elaborate a regional indicator combining the
values of these variables for every region in deviations from the national average. Thus, the
value of the indicator for the Spanish region j will be given by the following expression:
( ) ( ) ( )
esp j esp j esp j j X X X X X X IND 3 3 2 2 1 1 - - - + - =
where X1
j is the relative weight of manufacturing sector in region j, X1
esp is the relative weight
of the manufacturing sector in Spain, X2
j is the relative weight of the building sector in region
j, X2
esp is the relative weight of the building sector in Spain, X3
j is the average size of firms
located in region j, and X3
esp is the average size of firms located in Spain. As it has been
previously stated, the influence of the first two variables on the indicator (the regional
response) would be positive, while the third would be negative. So, if the indicator takes
positive values, the regional response to a common monetary shock would be higher to the
response at a national level, and, if it takes negative values it would be lower.13
Data for the three variables are the average value for the period 1985-1992. The analysis of
this period for the Spanish economy is specially relevant as it includes both an expansive
phase of the business cycle and a contractive one and also different monetary policy measures
(see annex 3). Averaging the data for explanatory variables is also appropriate, as we are
interested in analysing the average behaviour during the sample period. Averaging also
minimises the possibility that the results are affected by business-cycle dynamics (although
the average period is relatively short due to data availability). The data source for the relative
weights of manufacturing and building is Eurostat-Regio and data for the average firm size
come from DAISIE Annual industrial survey (New cronos). Both data are shown in annex 1.
The obtained values of the indicator of the regional relative response to a common monetary
shock for the Spanish regions are also shown in annex 1 and are represented in figure 3. As it
can be seen regions with the highest response are the Mediterranean regions joint with
Castilla-La Mancha, Rioja and Navarra, while regions with the lowest response are Madrid,
Murcia and Cantabric regions. In general terms, the obtained classification is similar to the
one obtained by De Lucio and Izquierdo (1998). The proposed indicator has also been
calculated for different countries at a national level and the obtained results have been
compared with the ones by Carlino and DeFina (1998). As it can be seen in annex 2, both
results show that Ireland and Spain have greater responses to a common monetary shocks that
France, Italy and Netherlands.
Figure 3. Regional indicator of monetary policy relative responses
















4.2. Implications of the empirical results
But, which are the implications of the existence of these differences?  From a theoretical
perspective, if some regions response with higher intensity to a common monetary shock than
the national average, when the shock is positive (expansive monetary policy), the regional
output growth rate will be higher than the national average, and, when the shock is negative
(contractionary monetary policy), the regional growth will be lower. If this is true, the
regional cyclical component of output evolution will be higher than the national component in
regions with higher responses to monetary policy. In other words, the variance of output in
these regions will be higher than the variance of national output. Figure 4 represents the
relationship between the standard deviation of the regional GAV growth rate and the indicator
of the regional relative response to monetary policy. As it can be seen, there is an empirical
positive relationship between both variables. These results reinforce, then, the idea that
different responses to a common monetary policy can increase the degree of cyclical
synchrony of regional economies and, as a result, it can increase the costs of taking part in a
currency union.
Figure 4. Relationship between the GAV growth rate standard deviation and the indicator of
monetary policy relative responses
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GAVsd = 0,58 + 0,8·10




Moreover, other fact, which would be even more worrying, is that those regions with a higher
variance of output have also experienced a lower output growth rate than the average (see
figure 5). This fact would imply that regions with a higher variance of output (higher response
to a monetary shock) grow less than the average. This result is consistent with the empirical
evidence obtained by Laxton  et al. (1995) for G-7 countries. However, the relationship
between both facts is not probably as simple as it has been stated, so future research should be
done to clarify this point.
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Other relevant aspect that has to be considered is what has happened to prices in regions with
a higher relative response. In this case, there is not a clear agreement on what happens with
regional inflation where the response to monetary shocks is higher than the rest. Following
classical theories, the response of prices to a monetary shock will be instantaneous. In fact,
the movements of prices in regions with a higher response to monetary shocks should be
higher than in the rest (in a similar way to output variations). So, if this view were true, one
would expect that the variance of inflation in regions with higher response would be higher
than in the rest. However, following (neo) keynesians theories, the existence of rigidities and
different responses of prices will make unclear the previous prediction. Other factor that
should be taken into account is the possibility that prices react more quickly to expansive16
monetary policies than to contractionary ones (see Tinsley and Krueger, 1997). Under this last
assumption, if prices are not fully flexible, the existence of different regional responses will
not always imply a higher value of the variance of regional inflation than the national one. In
figure 6 the relationship between the standard deviation of regional inflation and the regional
indicator of relative responses to monetary shocks is represented. As it can be seen, the sign
of the relationship is negative, the opposite of the sign predicted by classical theories.
However, no strong conclusion can be extracted from this. Something similar happens when
the relationship between the average regional inflation and the indicator of relative response
to monetary policy is considered (see figure 7).
Figure 6. Relationship between the inflation standard deviation and the indicator of monetary
policy relative responses
Indicator
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So, which are the implications of the obtained results for EMU? In spite of the simplicity of
the analysis and the possible deficiencies of the proposed indicator, some facts can be
remarked: First, the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in the paper suggests the
existence of important differences between regions in terms of responses to common
monetary shocks.  Second, after elaborating a regional indicator of relative responses to
common monetary shocks using direct data of the determinants of asymmetries related to the
different transmission mechanism of monetary policy, a clear relationship exists between a
higher response to monetary policy and a higher variance of output for the Spanish case. Also,17
there seems to be a negative relationship between the variance of regional output and the
regional output average growth rate, while no conclusion can be extracted from the existing
relationships between responses to monetary policy and inflation. In this sense, the obtained
results suggest that the potential risk of increasing asymmetries as a result of differences in
the transmission of a common monetary policy at a European level can be real. As under a
higher real asymmetry, macroeconomic adjustment would be more difficult under EMU, it
seems clear that any reform addressed to increase the efficiency of financial and monetary
markets could help to reduce the adverse effects of a single monetary policy (see European
Commission, 1997 and Costas and Bel, 1998). The main objective of these economic policies
would be to reduce the risk of “policy-induced” asymmetric shocks.
Figure 7. Relationship between the average inflation and the indicator of monetary policy
relative responses
Indicator
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ANNEX 1
Table A.1.1. Data for Spanish regions (average value 1985-1992)
Regions % Manufacturing % Building Average firm size Reg. indicator
ESP Spain 21,30 7,81 13,8 0
GAL Galicia 16,61 8,87 11,3 -0,33
AST Asturias 20,13 8,68 18,8 -4,31
CANT Cantabria 25,32 6,62 18,6 -0,48
PV País Vasco 31,30 5,24 27,0 -3,88
NAV Navarra 33,97 6,42 20,5 5,54
RIO Rioja 38,70 5,31 13,0 16,80
ARA Aragón 23,37 7,02 12,9 2,87
MAD Madrid 17,41 7,19 20,4 -10,17
CAST-L Castilla-León 19,67 8,06 10,9 2,32
CAST-M Castilla-La Mancha 17,41 9,42 7,3 4,39
EXT Extremadura 6,79 11,37 4,8 -1,38
CAT Cataluña 27,75 6,69 17,4 3,07
VAL Comunidad Valenciana 23,23 7,03 11,9 3,68
BAL Baleares 7,64 8,00 6,7 -5,32
AND Andalucía 14,56 9,52 10,2 -0,46
MUR Murcia 14,45 8,22 11,6 -3,41
CAN Canarias 6,91 9,23 8,0 -6,72
Source: Eurostat-Regio (1
st and 2
nd column) and DAISIE Annual industrial survey (NEW CRONOS) (3
rd column)21
Table A.1.2. Data for Spanish regions (averages and standard deviations 1985-1992)
Regions GAV av. GAV s.d. CPI av. CPI s.d.
ESP Spain 0,103 0,052 0,066 0,015
GAL Galicia 0,083 0,061 0,066 0,014
AST Asturias 0,081 0,056 0,065 0,015
CANT Cantabria 0,088 0,078 0,061 0,016
PV País Vasco 0,095 0,060 0,068 0,019
NAV Navarra 0,102 0,067 0,066 0,015
RIO Rioja 0,081 0,072 0,066 0,013
ARA Aragón 0,097 0,062 0,067 0,016
MAD Madrid 0,115 0,048 0,066 0,015
CAST-L Castilla-León 0,082 0,049 0,063 0,015
CAST-M Castilla-La Mancha 0,113 0,062 0,061 0,014
EXT Extremadura 0,101 0,061 0,061 0,017
CAT Cataluña 0,107 0,057 0,072 0,017
VAL Comunidad Valenciana 0,103 0,060 0,066 0,012
BAL Baleares 0,090 0,059 0,062 0,017
AND Andalucía 0,107 0,055 0,066 0,018
MUR Murcia 0,111 0,053 0,066 0,014
CAN Canarias 0,122 0,045 0,059 0,014
Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat-Regio (1
st and 2
nd columns) and INE (3rd and 4
th columns).22
ANNEX 2
Table A.2.1. Comparison at a national level between the proposed indicator and the long-run
response of output in front of a monetary shock obtained by Carlino and DeFina (1998)
% Manufacturing % Building Average firm size Indicator Carlino-DeFina
Spain 20,80 7,84 13,79 47,57 2,05
France 20,92 5,47 72,72 -13,60 1,42
Netherlands 18,55 5,48 94,16 -37,41 1,42
Ireland 29,88 5,52 44,71 23,41 2,20
Italy 23,98 5,97 82,64 -19,97 1,43
Source: Own elaboration from Eurostat-Regio (1
st and 2
nd column); DAISIE Annual industrial survey (NEW
CRONOS) (3
rd column) and Carlino and DeFina (1998).
ANNEX 3
Figure A.3.1. Evolution of main macroeconomic variables in Spain from 1985 to 1992 (annual
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Source: Eurostat (GAV) and INE (Consumer Prices Index, Interest Rates and M3).